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would probably have ,been no disagreement 
'in the IntersMe Oil case had the chal-
lenged tax heen imposed on the privilege 
-of engaging in the local activities in aid 
·of the interstate transportation of oil rather 
than on the privilege of engaging in the 
"very process" of that transportation. The 
·dissenting justices made it clear at the out-
set that the tax was not "for the privilege 
·of operating pumping machinery or other 
·equipment as incidents apart from the flow 
-of the interstate commerce, Cf. Coverdale 
Y. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Ca., 303 
U.S. 604, 58 S.Ct. 736, 82 L.Ed. 1043." 
·69 s.n. 1264, 1268. When a tax is im-
:posed on the privilege of conducting a 10-
-cal activity separable from the very proc-
esses of interstate commerce, "it is idle 
to' suggest that the tax is on 'the privilege 
,of engaging in interstate -business/" Mem-
phis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 
~5, 68 S.Ct. 1475, 1477; Central Greyhound 
Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 661, 
·68 s.n. 1260. A state may properly im-
pose a tax on the privilege of carrying on 
. a local activity, and the fact that the ac-
tivity is essential to interstate commerce 
·does not uprevent a State from giving [it] 
·detached relevance for purposes of local 
taxation." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 
.249,255,67 s.n. 274, 278; Western Live 
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 
.257, 58 S.Ct. 546; McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 47, 60 
·S.Ct. 388; Barker Bros., Inc. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 10 Ca1.2d 603, 609, 76 P.2d 97. It is 
undisputed that plaintiffs' activities are can-
·ducted whol1y within the jurisdiction of 
the taxing authority and that plaintiffs are 
required to pay on1y their share of the 
,cost of· the local government who.se protec-
·tion they enjoy. For ,the privilege of car-
rying on those activities, the city of Los 
Angeles can constitutionally impose the 
-challenged tax. 
, The' judgments are reversed. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, ED-
:~IONDS, CARTER, SCHAUER, and 
:SPENCE, J]., concur. 
84 Ca1.2d 811 
CODORNIZ v. CODORNIZ. 
Sac. 5935. 
Supreme Court of CalifornIa, in Bank. 
Feb. 28, 1950. 
Rehearing Denied March 27, 1950. 
DIvorce action by Allce D. Codornlz against 
Joseph M. Codorniz. Plaintiff was granted 
a divorce on ground of extreme cruelty, and 
thereafter defendant applied for modIfica-
tion of the final decree by eliminating pro-
visions of the support of plaintiff and a mar-
rIed daughter. . 
TIle Sllperior Court for C-olusa County, 
Ben R. Ragain, J., rendered an order modie 
fying the decree, and plaintiff appealed. 
Tbe Supreme Court, Schauer, J., held that 
the trial court was warranted in finding that 
the previous decree provided alimony and 
child support rather than a property settlee 
ment and hence was subject to modification. 
The Court also held that the husband was 
relieved of his obligation to pay alimony 
upon remarriage of the wife, and was not 
under obligation to support children upon 
their emancipation . 
Traynor, J., dissented. 
Prior opinion, see 202 P.2d 861. 
I. DIVorce ~245(1) 
Provision for payment of alimony to 
wife in a divorce decree granted to wife for 
offense of husband may be modified by the 
court under appropriate circumstances, al-
though a decree adjusting property rights 
of the parties is not subject to modification 
regardless of whether it is based upon 
agreement of the parties. 
2. Divorce ~245(1), 309 
In proceeding to modify divorce decree, 
trial court has jurisdiction to determine 
whether decree was based upon a property 
settlement agreement with payments pro-
vided as a phase of property adjustment 
and therefore· not subject to modification, 
or was based upon alimony or support al-
lowance covenants and therefore subject 
to modification. 
3. DIVorce ~286, 312.6(8) 
A divorce court's findings that pay-
ments ordered under a previous decree were 
CODORNIZ v. CODORNIZ 
Cite as 215 r.2d 32 
. Cal. 33 
not based upon a property settlement agree-
ment but were meant wholly or partially as 
:alimony and child support and were there-
fore subject to modification, when based 
upon ample evidence, are binding upon an 
appellate court. 
4. Divorce <'l=>245(3), 309 
In divorce action, evidence justified a 
finding that payments ordered in divorce 
-decree were intended as alimony and child 
support rather than as a property settle-
ment and consequently were subject to 
modification upon showing of changed cir-
cumstances of the parties. 
.5. Divorce ~252 
Where court granted wife a divorce 
()n ground of extreme cruelty, and divided 
equally all community property except an 
equity in an undivided one-third interest 
in a dairy business which court determined 
was practically valueless, and court award~ 
ed it to husband to enable him to earn 
money with which to pay alimony and sup-
port money for children, wife could not 
assert a right to the dairy bu'siness on 
ground that she was entitled to more than 
half the community property. Civ.Code, 
§§ 146, 148. 
(). Divorce ~247 
On remarriage of wife, divorced ht1s~ 
band is relieved of obligation to pay a1i~ 
mony. Civ.Code, § 139. 
7. Divorce ¢;>310 
Obligation of divorced husband to sup~ 
port children of the marriage ceases upon 
their emancipation or reaching majority. 
Civ.Code, § 206. 
8. Appeal and error <'l=>1058(2) 
Where wife was subsequently permit" 
ted to give testimony on certain phase of 
case, any error in earlier ruling of court 
denying her permission to testify as to such 
phase was not prejudicial. 
Brown, Ford & Cooney, Colusa, for ap~ 
pellant. 
Rutledge & Rutledge and Ralph W. Rut-
'ledge, Colusa, for respondent. 
215 P.2d-3 
SCHAUER, Justice. 
Plaintiff appeals from an order made by 
the trial court upon application of defend-
ant, reducing the monthly :payments or~ 
dered to be paid by defendant to plaintiff 
under the terms of an interlocutory and a 
final decree of divorce. Plaintiff contends 
that the payments were ordered as "a part 
of the division of the community property 
by the Court," and ,hence were not subject 
to modification. We have conCluded that 
the trial court was justified in determining 
that such payments were in the nature of 
alimony and child support and could and 
should be reduced, and that the order ap-
pealed from must be affirmed: 
In May, 1944, plaintiff sued defendant 
for divorce on the ground of extreme cruel-
ty. She" alleged, among other things, that 
she was then earning $65 a month and in 
addition was receiving $140 a month from 
defendant for her support and that of the 
three minor children of the parties, and 
that as community property the parties were 
possessed of a one-third interest in a dairy 
business having a value of approximately 
$30,000. Plaintiff prayed for a decree of 
divorce, for custody of the three children, 
that defendant be ordered to pay her at-
torney's fees and court costs, that he also 
"be ordered to pay the sum of $75.00 a 
month to plaintiff as alimony, and the sum 
of $105.00 a month for the support and 
maintenance of said minor children," and 
for other "fit and proper" orders. In his 
answer defendant denied "that the parties 
are possessed of a one-third interest in the 
dairy * * * and * * * alleges that 
he -is buying said interest on installment 
payments, most of which are yet unpaid." 
In June, 1944, plaintiff was granted an 
interlocutory decree of divorce on- the 
ground of cruelty, and was also awarded 
custody of the three children. The testi-
mony was not reported, and findings were 
waived. In June, 1945, the final decree 
was entered. Each of the decrees con~' 
tains a provision adjudging "That' the com-
munity property of the parties hereto con~ 
sisting of an equity in an undivided one~ 
third ('Is) interest in and to • • • a 
dairy business [and the land upon which 
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such business is operated 1] • • • be 
awarded to the Defendant, subject, how~ 
ever, to the following charges, restrictions 
and conditions: 
"1. Defendant herein shall pay to Plain-
tiff herein the sum of One Hundred Forty 
Dollars ($140.00) per month, as and for 
the support and maintenance of Plaintiff 
and the minor children of the parties here~ 
to, on the filst day of each and every cal-
endar month. 
"2. Defendant herein shall furnish 
Plaintiff and the minor children of the 
parties hereto, until further order of the 
Court, milk and cream at Defendant's sole 
cost and expense." 
Defendant paid the $140 a month to 
plaintiff through August, 1946. He then 
learned that plaintiff had remarried in July, 
1946, and he reduced the payments to $70 
a month for September and October, 1946-
In the latter month the oldest of the three 
children, a daughter, also married, and de-
fendant thereafter. paid only $50 a month. 
In November, 1947, plaintiff sought a con-
tempt order against defendant by reason 
.of the reduced payments, and defendant 
on the ground of changed circumstances 
applied to the court for a modification of 
the final decree by eliminating therefrom 
provisions for the support of plaintiff and 
of the married daughter. A consolidated 
hearing on the two matters was held before 
the same judge who had rendered the di-
vorce decrees. At the hearing the court, 
over plaintiff's objection that the court was 
without jurisdiction to change the prop-
erty and support provisions of the final 
decree, heard evidence concerning those 
issues and rendered its order modifying 
the divorce decrees by relieving the de-
fendant from payments for plaintiffs sup-
port as of the date she remarried, reduc-
ing the support payments for the three 
children to the sum of $105 a month to the 
date of the marriage of the elder daughter 
'(October 15, 1945) and to the sum of $70 
a month thereafter, and releasing defend-
ant's one-third interest in the dairy prop-
erty (including the land) from "all of the 
charges, restrictions and conditions" im-
posed thereon by the interlocutory and final 
decrees of divorce. This appeal by plain-
tiff followed. 
[1] As declared in Puckett v. Puckett 
(1943), 21 Cal.2d 833, 840, 136 P.2d 1, 5, 
U a provision for the payment of alimony 
to the wife in a divorce decree, granted to 
the wife for the offense of the husband, 
may be modified by the court under appro-
priate circumstances. Civ.Code, sec. 139. 
* * * A divorc,e decree adjusting the 
property rights of the parties is not sub-
ject to modification regardless of whether 
or not it is based upon the agreement of 
the parties." (See also Leupe v. Leupe 
(1942), 21 Cal.2d 145, 148, 130 P.2d 697; 
Adams v. Adams (1947), 29 Cal.2d 621, 
625, 177 P.2d 265; Dupont v. Dupont 
(1935), 4 Cal.2d 227, 228, 48 P.2d 677; 
Ettlinger v. Ettlinger (1935), 3 Cal.2d 172, 
178, 44 P.2d 540; Fields v. Fields (1949), 
94 Cal.App.2d 56, 209 P.2d 977. 
[2,3] It has also been held that in modi-
fication proceedings the trial court has 
jurisdiction to determine whether the de .. 
cree was based upon a property settlement 
agreement with payments provided as a 
phase of property adjustment and therefore 
not subject to modification or was based 
upon alimony or support allowance cove-
nants and therefore subject to modification. 
(See Hough v. Hough (1945), 26 Cal.2d 
605,615, 160 P.2d 15, and cases there cited; 
Alexander v. Alexander (1948), 88 Cal. 
App.2d 724, 727, 199 P.2d 348. In the 
Hough case t1Iis court pointed out that 
HIn various cases it has been assumed that 
the court may pass upon that issue or 
similar issues in such proceedings." [26 
Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d 20.] In the same 
case we quoted with approval the follow-
ing statement from Wallace v. Wallac;e 
(1934), 136 Ca1.App. 488, 493, 29 P.2d 314, 
made on appeal from an order denying a 
motion for modification: UFurthermore, 
this agreement was before the court upon 
the order for modification, and upon that 
hearing the court made the findings given 
above I to the effect t'hat the payments di-
rected to be made were not in the nature 
of alimony but 'was the balance of the 
I. The clause including the land appears in the final decree only. 
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sums due plaintiff under said contract of him to properly comply with the coures 
property settlement. That being a definite order for the support of the children and 
finding upon the issue before the court, of the widow. * * * The testimony at 
we are bound thereby. As the court said the time was that the community value in 
in Atlass v. Allass [1931], 112 Cal.App. the eontract of the purchase * • • was 
514, 297 P. 53, 54: 'Had the court found practically valueless, and that was the rca-
the provisions for support to have been son the Court made the order. The proof 
in fact by way of property settlement then was very very definite on that; there is no 
the said provisions could not have been question about that," 
disturbed * * *' ' There was ample evi-
dence to support the finding in the instant 
case, and we must therefore accept the 
same as true." (See also Weedon v. Wee-
don (1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 367, 369, 207 P. 
2d 78; Fields v. Fields (1949) supra, 94 
Cal.App.2d 56, 209 P.2d 977. It follows 
from the rules just stated that the trial court 
likewise has jurisdiction, in a proceeding 
such as this, to determine whether payments 
ordered under a decree concededly not 
based (at least not directly or wholly) 
upon a property settlement agreemen~ were 
intended to be in lieu of property rights 
and not subject to modification, or were 
meant wholly or partially as alimony and 
child support provisions and were therefore 
subject to modification, and that that court's 
findings based upon ~jample evidence to 
support" such findings are likewise binding 
upon an appellate court. 
At the hearing on the modification ap-
plication here, the trial judge declared it 
to be his Udefinite recollection that the 
tcstimony [at the divorce trial] showed 
that at that time the community interest 
in the contract of purchase of the dairy 
l)Usiness * * * was very, very slight 
* * * [T]he Court remembers very dis-
tinctly that (-he defendant testified * • • 
that as far as he was concerned he was 
willing-and did consider the equity of the 
community in the contract as being of prac-
tically no value-and he made the offer in 
court that he'd be very willing to step down 
and Qut and forget about it, and if she 
wanted the interest in the dairy property 
she could have it. ... * * He was will-
ing to turn ,it over to her if she wanted it." 
T'he judge further stated that "the Court, 
in keeping with that proof introduced at 
the trial of this case, made a ruling award-
ing all of the interest in the community 
property to the defendant so as to enable 
[4] Both plaintiff and defendant testi-
fied at the modification 'hearing that at the 
time of the divorce Haround $3,000" had 
been paid toward purchase of the interest 
in the dairy. Defendant further stated 
that the full purchase price of the one-
third share was $7,500, Hnot a cent down. 
I was paying it so much a month," and that 
his average income from operation of the 
dairy, to which he devoted his own serv-
ices, was $267 monthly. Concerning testi-
mony by plaintiff that the valuation of such 
share Hwas said to be $10,000.00," the court 
stated, lIif there had been any testimony 
at the time of the 'interlocutory decree that 
there was a community interest in that 
property of $10,000.00, the Court certainly 
would not have made an order awarding 
all of the community property to the de-
fendant; because that was not the testi-
mony." At the modification hearing the 
parties testified further that certain other 
community property had been divided be-
tween them outside of the. divorce suit: 
plaintiff had received furniture and a sav-
ings account and defendant received an 
automobile. In addition to the evidence 
summarized above is the fact that in her 
complaint for divorce plaintiff asked for 
the payment of monthly alimony and sup-
port for the children, and did not seek any 
interest in the community property. With 
the recited facts in mind it is apparent 
that the trial court was warranted in its 
holding that the payments ordered in the 
divorce decrees were intended as alimony 
and child support, and were consequently 
subject to modification upon the showing 
of the changed circumstances of the par-
ties. 
[5] Plaintiff relies upon the rule stated 
in Treece v. Treece (1932), 125 Cal.App. 
726, 728, 14 P.2d 95, that "Judgments are 
to have a reasonable intendment [citation], 
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and where it admits of two constructions 
t!hat one will be adopted which is con-
sonant with the judgment which should 
have been rendered on the facts and law 
of the case [citation]," and urges that in-
asmuch as the divorce was granted to her 
upon the ground of extreme cruelty she 
was entitled to more than half the ,com-
munity property and therefore the divorce 
decrees, under which the dairy interest 
was awarded to defendant subject to the 
payments ordered ·to be made to plaintiff, 
must be construed as an adjustment of the 
property rights of the parties. Although 
it was held in Tipton v. Tipton (1930), 209 
Cal.443, 444, 288 P. 65, 66, that "the plain 
inference to be derived" from the code 
sections (Civ.Code, §§ 146, 148) having to 
do with the assignment of community prop-
erty by the court "is t'hat when the divorce 
is granted on' the ground of extreme cruel~ 
ty the. n~moffending party is entitled to 
more than that awarded to one who is at 
fault," that holding was announced on 
appeal from an interlocutory decree grant~ 
ed on the ground of extreme ,cruelty, in 
which "all of the community property, 
consisting of real estate of the value of 
:$2,500 and an automobile" was awarded 
to defendant husband. By contrast, the 
community property involved in the in~ 
stant divorce suit (being only the equity in 
the undividesl one-third interest in the 
dairy business and land, all other com~ 
munity _property having been previously di~ 
vided otherwise than by court order in 
this divorce action) was stated by the court 
to be' "practically valueless" and to have 
been awarded to defendant to enable him 
to earn through his own services the money 
with which to pay the alinwny and support 
money for the children, which was sought 
by plaintiff in her complaint for divorce. 
Since we do not have here an appeal from 
the basic' judgment in the divorce suit, and 
have no means of knowing what evidence 
was before the court at the trial of that 
action, we have no legitimate basis for 
assuming that the court erred in such basic 
decision;- or that on the motion its con~ 
struction of its own judgment was in-
accurate~ Indeed, such evidence as is dis~ 
closed suggests t1tat the trial court was 
quite right in concluding that the dairy 
equity was "practically valueless"; defend-
ant, by devoting his services to the dairy, 
was able to draw from it only $267 month. 
ly. Obviously, the rule of the Tipton case 
is not controlling on this appeal. 
(6,7] It is, of course, established that 
upon the remarriage of the wife_ the hus· 
band is relieved of the obligation to pay 
alimony to her (Civ.Code, § 139; see Hale 
v. Hale (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 661, 663, 4.> 
P.2d 246), and that l1is obligation to sup-
port children of the marriage (other than 
under the conditions contemplated by sec~ 
tion 206 of the Civil Code, not· involved 
here) ceases upon their emancipation or 
reaching majority (Hale v. Hale (1935), 
supra; Meek v. Meek (1942), 51 Cal.App. 
2d 492, 125 P.2d 117; Putnam v. Putnam 
(1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 696, 699, 125 P.2d 
525; see also Hough v. Hough (1945), 
supta, 26 Ca1.2d 605. 608, 160 P.2d 15. In 
both the Meek and the Putnam cases it 
was held that in modification proceedings 
the trial court could, and in t'he Putnam 
case correctly did, interpret an agreement 
between the parties for payment by the 
husband of money for child support, as 
terminating when the children reached 
majority. 
(8] Plaintiff also complains of refusal' 
by the court at one stage in the modifica-
tion proceedings to permit her to testify as 
to whether she received 'liany of the com· 
munity property outside of" the divorce de· 
cree. However, as appears hereinabove,. 
she was later allowed to give her testimony 
on th~s phase of the case, and consequently 
any error in the earlier ruling of the court 
was not prejudicial to her. 
For the reasons stated hereinabove, the 
order appealed from is affirmed. 
GIBSON, C. J.. and SHENK,. ED· 




In my opinion the order affirmed hereiu 
deprives plaintiff of the share of the com· 
munity property to which she is entitled uh-
der section 146 of the Civil Code. 
-----
CODORNIZ v. CODORNIZ Ca!. 37 
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When the divorce decree awards some section 146 guarantees the plaintiff at least 
property to each party and also provides for half the community property when the di-
monthly payments, without specifying vorce is granted on the ground of extreme 
whether they are part of a property settle- cruelty. The majority opinion attempts to 
ment or alimony, it may be difficult to de- distinguish the Tipton case on the ground 
termine what they are. Sec Puckett v. that the trial judge considered the $3,000 
Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 841, 136 P.2d 1; equity in the dairy business to be "practical-
Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 615, 160 ly valueless." A $3,000 equity in a dairy 
P.2d 15; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621, business worth $30,000 is not "practically 
625, 177 P.2d 265. When, as in this case, valueless." 
however, the court awards all the com- At the very least, the equity in the dairy 
munity property to the husband, the month- had the value of a right to complete the 
ly payments clearly constitute part of a purchase of the one-third interest. What~ 
settlement of property rights. ever the court thought of the value of the 
It is undisputed that when the inter~ property, there can be no doubt that had 
locutory decree of divorce was entered ap- there been no award of monthly payments 
proximately $3,000 had been paid for the plaintiff would have been deprived of her 
community interest in the dairy. Plaintiff share thereof. She is just as much de-
was granted a divorce on the ground of prived of that share when the court ter-
extreme cruelty and was therefore entitled minates the payments on the ground that 
to at least half the community property. they were alimony. 
(Civ.Code, § 146.) The court awarded all Community property is often a going 
the community property to defendant and business managed by the husband. It may 
ordered him to pay plaintiff $140 per month then be to the best interests of both parties 
for the support and maintenance of herself to avoid liquidation of the business by 
and the three minor children. These pay~ awarding the wife her share ·of the prop-
ments were made a charge against the com- erty in the form of monthly payments. 
munity property awarded to defendant. Such a division will be equitable, however, 
Since Civil Code section 146 guarantees only if those payments are treated, not'as 
plaintiff at least half the community prop- alimony, but as part of a property settle-
erty, the decree ordering payments to her ment not subject to modification. If, for 
must be· interpreted as a decree adjusting example, the community property is worth 
the property rights of the parties to protect $200,000 and the decree provides that the 
her interest in the community property. husband receive all of it and that the wife 
The holding that the payments were ali- on the basis of her life expectancy receive 
many and subject to modification is in $500 per month, and one year after her 
fact a holding that the trial court entered divorce the wife remarries, it would be 
a decree it could not validly enter. It is manifestly inequitable to hold that the pay-
settled that if a judgment is susceptible ments were alimony and therefore termi-
of two interpretations, aBe of which would nated, for she would then receive only 
make it invalid and the other valid, it must $6,000 in lieu of community property worth 
be given the interpretation that renders it at least $100,000. The inequity is just as 
valid. Treece v. Treece, 125 Ca1.App. 726, real if the amount involved is small. 
728, 14 P.2d 95; Watson v. Lawson, 166 
Cal. 235, 242, 135 P. 961; Webster v. Web-
ster, 216 Cal. 485, 488, 14 P.2d 522; Hogar-
ty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625, 627, 206 P. 
79. 
In Tipton v. Tipton, 209 Cal. 443, 288 P. 
65, a decree awatding the defendant all 
the community property, consisting of real 
eState worth $2,500 and an automobile, was 
reversed on the ground that Civil Code 
There can be no stability to such prop-
erty settlements if the court, as in this case, 
uses defendant's earnings some three years 
after the decree was enterd as a basis for 
a determination that all the community 
property was properly awarded to him. 
A business of great value may still not 
make a profit. It may be profitable at the 
time a divorce decree is entered but un-
profitable thereafter. When the husband 
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agrees to make monthly payments in lieu 
of liquidating the business, he assumes the 
risk that it may not be so profitable or of 
such value as he supposed. If the trial 
court erred "in making that choice for him 
in the divorce decree, his remedy is by 
appeal. "A divorce decree adjusting the 
property rights of the parties is not sub-
ject to modification regardless of whether 
or not it is based upon the agreement of the 
parties." Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 
840, 136 P.2d 1, 5. 
rt is clear from the record that the trial 
judge concluded that he had erred in award-
ing plaintiff monthly payments in lieu of 
her share of the community property and 
that he sought to correct his error in the 
modification proceedings. If he made an 
error, however, it was judicial and not 
clerical in character. "The judgment in 
this case was the identical judgment which 
the tri~l court intended to render. There 
was no mistake in its entry, and it ex· 
pressed in apt and definite terms the con-
clusion at which the trial court arrived dur-
ing the trial of the action. If the court 
misconstrued the evidence before it, or 
misapplied the law applicable to the facts 
disclosed by the evidence, or was even 
misled by counsel, such an error was in 
no sense a clerical error which could there-
after be corrected by the court upon its 
own motion or in any procce,ding except 
on motion for a new trial." Lankton v. 
Superior Court, 5 Ca1.2d 694, 696, 55 P.2d 
1170; Stevens v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 
110, 112, 59 P.2d 988; In re Estate of 
BU1'llett, 11 Ca1.2d 259, 262, 79 P.2d 89; 
Bastajian v. Brown, 19 Ca1.2d 209, 214, 
120 P.2d 9; Barlow v. City Council of City 
of Inglewood, 32 Ca1.2d 688, 692-693, 197 
P.2d 721; see, 2 McBaine, California Trial 
and Appellate Practice, pp. 204-214; 9 
Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 2450. 
Once the divorce decree became final, the 
trial judge was powerless to . change the 
amount awarded to plaintiff in lieu of com· 
munity property, even if he concluded that 
the amount awarded was excessive. He 
cannot lawfully do so indirectly by disre-
garding the comlnunity property award and 
holding the monthly payments to be ali-
"(~on~. 
In any event, the award cannot be made 
to appear excessive unless the dual func-
tion of the monthly payments is disregard-
ed. The decree provided, not only for a 
settlement of property rights, but for the 
support of the minor children. The amount 
to be allotted for this support was not 
specified as it should have been, cf. Puckett 
v. Puckett, 21 Ca1.2d 833, 841, 136 P.2d 
1; Hough v. Hough, 26 Ca1.2d 605, 615, 160 
P.2d 15; Adams v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621, 
625, 177 P.2d 265, but given the division 
adopted by the trial court in the modifica-
tion proceedings, it appears that only one 
fourth of the $140, or $35 per month, can 
be attributed to the wife's share of the com-
munity property. Had the decree provided 
that defendant was to receive all the com-
munity property and plaintiff was to re ... 
ceivc $35 per month for her support and 
maintenance and $105 per month for the 
support and maintenance of the minor chil-
dren, there would be no question that the 
provision for the payment of $35 per month 
was part of a settlement of the property 
rights and therefore not subject to modifi-
cation. Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625, 
627,206 P. 79; Webster v. Webster, 216 
Cal. 485, 488, 14 P.2d 522; Puckett v. 
Puckett, 21 Ca1.2d 833, 842, 136 P.2d 1. 
It is only when the amounts properly at-
tributable to child support are treated as 
relevant to the division of the community 
property that the total award is made to 
appear too large to be reasonably attribu~ 
table in part to a division of the community 
property. 
The payments were ordered Has and for 
the support and maintenance of Plaintiff 
and the minor children of the parties here· 
to." In view of the disparity between the 
total award and an amount appropriate 
solely for a division of the community 
property, it would be unreasonable to con-
clude that it was intended that the total 
amount continue to be payable after the 
p.arcntal- duty of support had terminated. 
Putnam v. Putnam, 51 Ca1.App.2d 696, 699, 
125 P.2d 525; Meck v. Meek, 51 Ca1.App. 
2d 492, 495, 125 P.2d 117. Had the decree 
properly segregated the amounts attribu-
table to child support, there would be no 
pr-obkm in determining w~at reduction 
GRIFFIN v. VAN WINKLE Cal. 3n 
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should be made. When the decree is silent defendant was agent of other or that they 
on the question of allocation, however, it 
has been held proper for the trial conrt to 
determine the reasonable allocation in s'l1b~ 
sequent proceedings. Putnam v. Putnam, 
supra; 1Yleek v. Meek, supra. In this case 
the trial court has determined that $35 
per month is the amount attributable to the 
support of each child. Accordingly, the Of-
der should be affirmed to the extent that 
it reduces the payments attributable to the 
support of the children by $35 per month 
in view of the marriage of the cldest child. 
The unqualified affirmance of the order, 
which terminates plaintiff's right to re-
ceive $35 per month, deprives her of her 
share cl the community property in viola~ 
tion of section 146 of the Civil Code. 
Rehearing 
senting. 
denied; TRAYNOR, J., dis-
o II K~a"'''"'''';:''-::'':::'':::'"'' 
, 
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Action by R. I..I. Griffin and l\I. E. Miller, 
Individually, and doing business as R. L. 
Griffin and M. E. Miller Lumber Company, 
against 'V. S. Van WInkle, individunlly and 
doing business as Chicago I.lumber Company, 
Bobbie CoIlins, and others, to recover COll-
tract price for certain doors allegedly sold 
and delivered by them to defendants, 01' in 
lieu of payment, for return of the doors. 
The Superior Court, San Joaquin County, 
Thomas B. Quinn, J. t entered judgment for 
plaintiffs and defendant Van Winkle ap-
pealed. 
The District Court of Appeal, Peck, .T., 
held that evidence was insufficient to sustain 
Judgment· for ,plaintiffs on theory that one 
were joint adventurers. 
Judgment reversed. 
I. Joint adventures ~1.15 
Principal and agent ~3(4)' 
In action to recover contract price for 
certain doors allegedly sold and delivered 
by plaintiffs to defendants, or in lieu of 
payment, for return of doors, evidence was 
insufficient to sustain judgment for p1ain-
tiffs on theory that one defendant was 
agent of other or that they were joint ad-
venturers. 
2. Appeal and error <P840(1), 1078(1) 
In action for recovery of contract price 
of doors, issue as to whether title to doors 
passed from plaintiff to third party under 
theory of cash sale, which was neither em-
braced by pleadings or findings nor argued, 
:would not be considered on appeal. 
~1:ancuso & Herron, San Francisco, for 
appellant. 
Lindsay P. Marshall, Lodi, for respond-
ents. 
PEEK, Justice. 
By their complaint plaintiffs sought to 
recover the contract price for certain doors 
allegedly sold and delivered by thcm to the 
defendants, or in lieu of payment, for the 
return of the doors. The cause was heard 
by the court sitting without a jury, and 
judgment was entered for plaintiffs. De-
fendant Van Winkle alone appeals. 
The complaint is in three counts. The 
first count alleges that on February 24, 
1947, plaintiffs sold and delivered to defend-
ants 627 doors for an alleged agreed price 
of $6,136.25; that payment for the doors 
was made by a check executed by Gerald lYL 
Goldstein payable to defendant Collins and 
endorsed in blank by Collins; that Collins 
was the agent of defendant W. S. Van 
\;Vinkle individually, and doing business as 
Chicago Lumber Company; that when the 
check was presented fo'r payment the ac-
count upon which it was drawn was closed; 
and that plaintiffs' dem~nd for payment or ' 
